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INTRODUCTION
The right of privacy has been recognized by the United States Supreme
Court as a fundamental right under both due process and equal protection
analyses.' From an examination of the cases defining the right of privacy, it is
clear that the limits of this right have yet to be delineated.2 Perhaps one of the
most volatile areas in which the right of privacy has been implicated is that of
sexual intimacy. The right has been invoked to protect the choice of married
persons to engage in certain acts of sexual intimacy,3 unmarried individuals to
engage in a non-procreative sexual relationship, 4 and homosexual persons to
engage in intimate sexual behavior
Because this relatively new constitutional right6 implicates one of the
most fundamental aspects of human existence,7 it is imperative that the limits
of its protection be carefully considered and delicately drawn. This Comment
will examine the right of privacy as it affects sexual intimacy between two
individuals without regard to their marital status or their gender. The right of
privacy as it has developed in the United States will be examined briefly. The
right to respect for one's private life will then be examined under the
European Convention on Human Rights, 8 and the relation of privacy to the
right of intimate association described. Finally, this Comment will consider
the rational limits of the right of privacy in the United States within the
international context of respect for the individual's private life.
1. The right of privacy was first identified as a fundamental right in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). It was cited as a fundamental right in Griswold and in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); and
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Griswold Court cited Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), decided
on equal protection grounds as a "right of privacy" case. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
2. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
3. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 977 (1976).
4. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2323 (1981).
5. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901,
rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976) (unsuccessfully); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980) (successfully), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2323 (1981).
6. The right of privacy was first identified as a fundamental right in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). In contrast, the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791, and the 14th amendment was added in 1868.
7. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 941-48 (1978); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979).
8. See notes 121-68 and accompanying text infra.
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I. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES
The right of privacy in the United States is not a static doctrine. From its
inception it has encompassed the most important of personal freedoms9 and
has evolved to the point where, today, it implicitly protects the right of all
individuals to associate with whomever they please in an intimate relation-
ship.
The right of privacy was first articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.'0 In Griswold, the Court held unconstitu-
tional a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives by married
couples." Considerable emphasis was placed upon the sanctity of marriage
and the protection from outside interference afforded two individuals
committed to that relationship. The idea that the state could invade "the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms' 'A 2 was held to be offensive to the right
of privacy found in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
The Supreme Court again addressed the privacy issue in Eisenstadt v.
Baird,3 a case in which another statute forbidding the distribution of contra-
ceptives-this time to unmarried persons-was declared unconstitutional. In
this opinion Justice Brennan articulated what is probably the most concise
definition of the right of privacy in American constitutional law: "If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."' 4 Thus defined, the right of privacy becomes a right to avoid some-
thing, a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat-
ters ... fundamentally affecting a person."
The right of privacy is not limited to conduct engaged in by persons in the
9. As Justice Brandeis noted:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They
knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The right was recognized implicitly, however, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 263
U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
I1. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
12. Id.
13. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
14. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). The Eisenstadt definition of the right of privacy is heavily relied upon
by jurists and commentators. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2323 (1981); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (E.D.
Va. 1975), (Merhige, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Lasson, Homosexual Rights: The Law in
Flux and Conflict, 9 BALT. L. REV. 47, 54 (1979); Note, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 533, 575 (1976); Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: A Set-Back for the Right of
Privacy, 65 KY. L.J. 748, 756 (1977); Recent Decision Note, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 15 DUQUESNE
L. REV. 123, 125 (1976).
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privacy of their own homes. 5 In Roe v. Wade 6 the Supreme Court expanded
the right of privacy to include the right of a woman to terminate a pregnancy.
The Court held that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is to be made by the
woman in consultation with her physician and not by the State. 7 The Roe
decision, however, did not articulate an absolute right of privacy devoid of
governmental intrusion. Only "unwarranted governmental intrusion" was
held to be forbidden by the constitutional right of privacy under Roe.' The
Supreme Court determined that each state remains authorized to promulgate
reasonable regulations for the safety and health of the woman during the
second trimester of pregnancy and may, in the interest of protecting potential
life, forbid abortion during the third trimester of pregnancy, except where the
abortion is necessary to preserve the woman's life or health. 9
Thus, in Roe, the Court makes it clear that governmental intrusion into
an individual's lifestyle is permissible only when the state shows that such
intrusion is "warranted., 20 However, it is also clear from the decision that
the state must show that the governmental intrusion is necessary to achieve
compelling state objectives.2'
The right of privacy, most recently expanded within the context of pro-
creational choice," is an expression of commitment to individual autonomy
and freedom from governmental intrusion into private choices.23 The
Supreme Court enunciated the constitutional commitment to individual
autonomy in Meyer v. Nebraska24 as follows:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included
things have been definitively stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
15. For a more expansive view of privacy, see Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,
428-36 (1980) (characteristics of privacy include information known about an individual, attention paid to an
individual, and physical access to an individual). See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562 (1977) (cause of action for invasion of "'right of publicity" recognized); Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (cause of action for "false light" invasion of privacy recognized); Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (constitutional limits on cause of action for invasion of privacy); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652I (defining causes of action for invasion of privacy).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Id. at 153.
18. Id. at 154-55.
19. Id. at 164-65.
20. This burden has proven difficult to overcome; many state statutes purporting to regulate abortions have
been declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v.
Bolton, 4 10 U.S. 179 (1973); Wolfe v. Schroerling, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976); Friendship Medical Center, Ltd.
v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975). Many, however, have
not. See, e.g., Poelker v. Doe, 434 U.S. 519 (1977); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
21. The standard to be applied in cases in which a violation of a fundamental right is alleged is "strict
scrutiny." See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
22. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (involving the right of a woman to use contraceptives or to terminate a pregnancy).
23. E.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
24. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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from bodily restraint but also the right ... generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.2
5
In Stanley v. Georgia26 the Court defined the limits of permissible intru-
sion by the state by holding that the State may not impose itself in an indivi-
dual's home to enforce its otherwise valid obscenity statute. Under the reason-
ing of Stanley, the state may not intrude into an individual's home even to
enforce a statute that it may enforce within a public sphere. It may, therefore,
be argued that governmental intrusion into a truly private sphere, such as an
individual's home, must meet a much higher standard of constitutional review
than would governmental regulation of clearly public conduct.
Stanley v. Georgia was a decision based upon the freedom from intrusion
guaranteed by the fourth amendment, while Roe v. Wade was a decision
based upon the right of autonomous action found in the penumbra of the Bill
of Rights and the fourteenth amendment.27 In the context of intimate relation-
ships, this distinction becomes blurred. Such relationships are pursued pri-
marily in a strictly private context; hence, the doctrine of freedom from
intrusion applies.28  However, the right of "locational" privacy found in
Stanley v. Georgia and Griswold v. Connecticut has been expanded to
encompass the right to personal autonomy in life choices, regardless of the
forums in which those choices are pursued. 29 Thus, the autonomy guaranteed
by the right of privacy extends into the public sphere, and individuals are
guaranteed the right to the orderly pursuit of happiness.30 The choice to
pursue an intimate relationship is protected within the home and arguably in a
more public sphere.
Once the concept is accepted that the pursuit of happiness by individuals
should be protected by the Constitution, and particularly by the right of
privacy, it follows that the pursuit of intimate relationships, so central to the
happiness of human beings,31 is protected. Under the doctrine expressed in
25. Id. at 399. See also notes 38-40 and accompanying text infra (discussing the common law action of
invasion of privacy and the accompanying right to be free from invasion by other individuals).
26. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
27. See notes 15-21 and accompanying text supra.
28. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599 n.24 (1977); note 26
and accompanying text supra.
29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the right to terminate a pregnancy is exercised, of necessity, in a
hospital or clinic, not in a private home or bedroom); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981) (the right ofautonomous choice in sexual matters may
be exercised in a car parked on a public street and the court will not inquire into the privacy of the forum).
30. Olmstead v, United States, 277 U.S. 438.(1928); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923). See also
People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981).
(The New York Court of Appeals refused to reach the issue of whether sexual conduct in a parked car was
within a "private sphere," holding instead that the autonomy guaranteed by the right of privacy encompassed
such conduct).
31. A noted psychologist has stated:
The needs for safety, belongingness, love relations and for respect can be satisfied only by other
people, i.e., only from outside the person. This means considerable dependence on the environment. A
person in this dependent position cannot really be said to be governing himself, or in control of his own
fate. He must be beholden to the sources of supply of needed gratifications. Their wishes, their whims,
their rules and laws govern him and must be appeased lest he jeopardize his sources of supply.
A. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 25, 34 (1968).
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Stanley, the pursuit of intimate relationships within one's own home is
protected from governmental intrusion. a2 The right of autonomous choice
expressed in Roe v. Wade protects the "public component" of intimate rela-
tionships as long as a compelling governmental justification does not limit the
exercise of choice in the orderly pursuit of happiness.
The notion of protecting an individual's privacy is not new. In Whalen v.
Roe33 the Supreme Court summarized the interests protected by the right of
privacy: the right of individuals to be free from governmental intrusion into
their private affairs ;34 protection from involuntary exposure of private affairs;35
and freedom from governmental compulsion in one's action, thought, experi-
ence, and belief.36 While the rights to be free from governmental intervention
and compulsion are protected by constitutional provisions, 37 freedom from
invasion of privacy by individuals has been protected by the law of torts38 and
its remedies3 9 The private sphere is no less sacrosanct when invaded by the
state and must be equally well protected. It would be anomalous for the
common law to refuse to tolerate an intrusion by one individual upon the
seclusion of another but for the Constitution to tolerate an intrusion by the
state upon the seclusion of an individual.4
Underlying the decisions from Meyer v. Nebraska to Roe v. Wade, and
beyond, is the principle that autonomous choice has constitutional value. The
Constitution of the United States is the embodiment of the rights of a free
people to the orderly pursuit of happiness, and this same Constitution places
limits on the states' power to regulate autonomous choice. Only with compel-
ling justification can the state proscribe the exercise of autonomous choice by
individuals that is protected by the right of privacy.' The pursuit of intimate
relationships, be they within the state-sanctioned institution of marriage,
between unmarried persons of opposite gender, or between unmarried
persons of the same gender, falls easily within the constitutional protection of
autonomous choice in the orderly pursuit of happiness.
It. CHALLENGING GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION INTO THE
FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
Nowhere is the intrusion into the fundamental choice of intimate associa-
tion so transparently illustrated as in the interference of various states with
32. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra. The pursuit of intimate relationships within one's home
also is protected from intrusion by other individuals. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text infra.
33. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
34. Id. at 599 n.24. See notes 10-32 and accompanying text supra.
35. 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977). See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
36. 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977).
37. See notes 10-32 and accompanying text supra.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-6521 (1976).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D (1976).
40. An individual into whose home another has intruded has a remedy at common law. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D (1976). However, in some states the State remains free to intrude upon an
individual in his or her home to enforce its sodomy law. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
41. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
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individuals' right to form intimate relationships with partners of the same sex.
At least one court has found such intrusion unconstitutional 42 but this case is
the exception. Apparently overcome by the "immorality" 43 of homosexuality
per se," the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
upheld the constitutionalaity of Virginia's consensual sodomy law in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney.4 5 The court disposed of the right of privacy as if
Griswold v. Connecticut'6 were the only authority for the constitutional limits
of the right:
With no authoritative judicial bar to the proscription of homosexuality-since it is
obviously no portion of marriage, home or family life-the next question is
whether there is any ground for barring Virginia from branding it as criminal. If a
State determines that punishment therefor, even when committed in the home, is
appropriate in the promotion of morality and decency, it is not for the courts to say
that the State is not free to do so.
47
This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court without opinion.g
Courts and commentators have raised numerous justifications to uphold
the constitutionality of sodomy statutes. Among these are that sodomy
statutes are necessary to protect and maintain morality and decency,49 that
the Bible evidences a divine proscription of sodomy,50 that acts of sodomy are
42. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,415 N.E.2d 936,434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323
(1981). In 1979 twenty-nin6 states and the District of Columbia retained criminal penalties for deviant sexual
conduct between consenting adults in private. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 949-51 (1979). The state of New Jersey
repealed its consensual sodomy law in 1980. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:98-2 (West 1980) (repealing N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:143-1, 143-2). The Court of Appeals of New York held that state's consensual sodomy law
unconstitutional under the right of privacy. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981).
43. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra.
44. See notes 84-87 and accompanying text infra.
45. 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
46. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901
(1976). Note that this passage clearly illustrates the district court's view of sodomy laws as a proscription of
homosexuality, not a proscription of particular sexual conduct. The court makes no mention of the extensive
history of the development of the right of privacy and its protection of the "orderly pursuit of happiness"; the
court simply states that homosexual relationships do not fit within the sphere of "marriage, home or family life"
presented in Griswold and are, therefore, excluded from protection. Finally, the court fails to mention Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and instead makes the sweeping statement that the state may intrude into an
individual's home to enforce the nebulous concepts of "morality and decency."
48. 425 U.S. 901, rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976). But see notes 140-41 and accompanying text infra.
The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue in any later case. Therefore, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
stands as the latest authority on the constitutionality of sodomy statutes. But see People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d
476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981) (distinguished Doe on the basis
that the Supreme Court summarily aflirmed because the plaintiffs lacked standing).
49. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 489, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951-52 (1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Reply Brief on Behalf of Defendants at 22-25, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
50. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488 n.3, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 n.3 (1980),
cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.Supp. 1199, 1202 n.2 (E.D. Va.
1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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unnatural and deviant,5' that the failure to legally proscribe sodomy will result
in the destruction of the institution of marriage5 2 that the failure to legally
proscribe sodomy will place minors in danger of homosexual assault, 3 that
the public despises homosexuality,5 and that homosexuality might become an
accepted lifestyle if the legal proscriptions against it were removed 5
These justifications have been answered by legal commentary and at
least one judicial decision5 6 Morality and decency are concepts that defy
precise definition. They are dependent upon human perceptions of "right and
wrong" and are often rooted in theology. However, in the pursuit of public
morality, the moral basis of the Constitution is too frequently overlooked.
The right of each individual to be free in his or her private life is no less a
manifestation of the moral order of society than is the protection of public
decency. "In order to understand and interpret the constitutional design, we
must take seriously the radical vision of human rights that the Constitution
was intended to express and in terms of which the written text of the Constitu-
tion was intended to be interpreted., 57 The moral order of society is deni-
grated, not served, by the elevation of the beliefs of some individuals that
homosexuality is immoral over the commitment to human rights and freedoms
embodied in the Constitution. The refusal of some courts to permit the legisla-
tion of morality 58 at the expense of individual freedoms constitutes judicial
recognition of the supremacy of the moral basis of the Constitution over the
beliefs of individuals.
The notion that homosexuality is immoral is deeply rooted in the Judeo-
Christian ethic 9 Several passages from the Bible are cited frequently as
authority for this notion.60 These passages, however, are far from conclusive
51. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940,434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 (1980), cert. denied,
101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981); Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45
FRRDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1285-86 (1977).
52. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 490, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951-52 (1980) cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(Merhige, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 994
(1979).
53. WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OFTHE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITU-
TION 56-57 (1963).
54. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S.
901 (1976); Reply Brief on Behalf of Defendants at 26, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975).
55. Reply Brief on Behalf of Defendants at 27, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975).
56. See notes 57-83 and accompanying text infra.
57. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights
and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 960 (1979).
58. E.g., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488 n.3, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 n.3
(1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981).
59. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'dmem., 425 U.S. 901
(1976).
60. Id. at 1202 n.2. See J. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY 92,95
(1980); J. MCNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 37-39 (1976); L. SCANZONI &V. MOLLENKOTtT,
IS THE HOMOSEXUAL MY NEIGHBOR 54, 59-63 (1978).
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on the issue of the morality of homosexuality, even from a Biblical viewpoint.
Biblical scholars have argued that the oft-quoted passages regarding homo-
sexuality are misinterpreted 6' and that it is possible that the passages are
incorrectly translated.62 Thus, even Biblical scholars are unable to agree on
the morality of the homosexual lifestyle.
It has often been stated that homosexual conduct is deviant or "un-
natural." 63 "Unnatural" is defined as "not being in accordance with nature or
consistent with a normal course of events" and "not being in accordance with
normal feelings or behavior.'' 64 Interestingly, Masters and Johnson have
shown that the physiological response patterns of homosexual couples differ
little from those of heterosexual couples.65 Therefore, it cannot credibly be
argued that homosexual conduct is not "consistent with a normal course of
events."
A significant result of the studies carried out by Masters and Johnson
relates directly to the issue of whether homosexual feelings are "in accord-
ance with normal feelings or behavior." These investigators found:
In handling sexual fantasy material, particularly that which runs counter to
cultural mores, there must be constant awareness of the great difference between
what men and women publicly profess as acceptable sexual conduct, what they
report as fantasy content during most interviews, and what they fantasize pri-
vately and reveal only in unusual circumstances.
Cross-preference sexual interaction had been described as "unthinkable,"
"revolting," "inconceivable" during discussions with small groubs of fully com-
mitted heterosexual or homosexual men and women. Yet the very men and
women whose public condemnation of variant sexual activity was most vitriolic
evidenced a significant curiosity, a sense of sexual anticipation, or even fears for
effectiveness of sexual performance when musing in private interviews on the
subject of cross-preference sexual interaction. 66
Thus, one should not rely on the public protestations of individuals for the
delineation of what constitutes "normal feelings or behavior." When con-
fronted with such inconsistencies between what people publicly profess as
acceptable and what they privately consider with interest, the need for the
protection of a right of privacy becomes especially clear.67
The myth that sodomy is physically harmful has been dispelled by the
research of Masters and Johnson.63 No significant differences in the sexual
61. J. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY 92-117 (1980); J.
MCNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 37-50, 56-66 (1976).
62. See authorities cited in note 61 supra.
63. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951(1980), cert. denied,
101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981); Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1285-86 (1977).
64. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 972 (1971).
65. W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE 170-71, 124-43 (1979).
66. Id. at 186.
67. The same inconsistencies exist with respect to "deviant" behavior. "Deviant" is defined as "deviating
esp. from some accepted norm." WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 227 (1971).
68. W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE 83-86 (1979).
[Vol. 43:143
HUMAN RIGHTS
responses of heterosexual, homosexual, and ambisexual 69 men and women
were reported. In addition, the physiology of anal intercourse was studied
under laboratory conditions and no physical harm was reported.70 That
sodomy can transmit venereal diseases is no more significant than the fact
that sexual contact of any sort can spread venereal diseases.7' Thus, those
who have argued that sodomy should be prohibited because it is physically
harmful have been unable to carry their burden of proof.7
The argument that the legalization of homosexual conduct somehow will
inhibit heterosexual marriage has been described as "unworthy of judicial
response." 73 The contention that significant numbers of individuals would
forego heterosexual marriage if they were permitted a choice between a
heterosexual or homosexual lifestyle belies a fear that "homosexual
preference is so strong and universal and heterosexual preference so weak
(and conventional family life so unattractive) that people would, on a
massive scale, tend not to undertake heterosexual marriage if homosexuality
as a way of life were legitimate." 4 Such a fear is without basis in fact.75
Much discussion of the decriminalization of homosexual conduct centers
on the fear that decriminalization will leave children in increased danger of
homosexual assault.76 The likelihood of such a result is no greater than the
likelihood that children will be subject to heterosexual assault under current
statutes.77 Sexual assault of children can be directly proscribed by statute.78 If
a statute omits sex-specific language, any sexual assault upon a child will be
proscribed, and the sex of the assailant would be irrelevant. Some states have
drafted rape and other sexual assault statutes to include more varieties of
sexual conduct than vaginal intercourse. 9 These statutes directly protect
children from sexual assault, making additional, indirect methods, such as
sodomy statutes, unnecessary.
69. The term "ambisexual person" describes those "[slubjects describing a history of sexual experience in
which male and female partners were involved in approximately equal numbers.... These men and women
were given a Kinsey preference rating of 3." Id. at 144. For a discussion of Masters and Johnson's use of the
Kinsey rating system, see id. at 7-10.
70. Id. at 83-86.
71. See Reply Brief on Behalf of Defendants at 28, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975).
72. E.g., People v. Onofre,51N.Y.2d476, 488-89,415 N.E.2d 936, 941,434N.Y.S.2d 947,951(1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981).
73. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting),
aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
74. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights
and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 994 (1979).
75. Estimates of the percentage of homosexual persons among citizens of the United States vary widely,
but nowhere is the percentage estimated at greater than 14%. E.g., Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The
Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 800 n.4 (1979).
76. WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMrrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTI-
TUTION 46 (1963).
77. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights
and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 988 (1979).
78. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02-.06 (Page 1975).
79. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (Page 1975). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (deviant
sexual intercourse by force or imposition).
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The inherent flaw in the argument that sodomy should be criminally
proscribed because the public despises homosexuality s° is graphically illus-
trated by the inconsistency between this argument and the argument that
homosexual conduct might become acceptable if it were not criminally
proscribed."' A public that truly despises homosexuality will not cease to
despise it if criminal sanctions against homosexuality are removed.82 It is
impossible to sort out whether homosexuality is illegal because it is despised
or whether it is despised because it is illegal. Whatever the purported justifica-
tion for despising homosexual persons, the imposition of criminal penalties
based upon public sentiment abandons the commitment found in the Constitu-
tion to preserving the rights of minority populations
3
In addition to rebutting the above purported justifications for sodomy
statutes, opponents of sodomy legislation have argued that it effectively
criminalizes the "status" of being a homosexual person in violation of the
eighth amendment to the Constitution 4 Plaintiffs in Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney argued that they had been the object of police abuse and that "[s]uch
abuse has branded Doe with the stigma of criminality, directly emanating
from the law's proscription of the one form of sexual gratification which he
can enjoy." ' The court's response to the argument that "no authoritative bar
to the proscription of homosexuality" exists8 6 lends credence to the argument
that sodomy laws effectively criminalize the status of homosexuality. The
Supreme Court has held that legislation criminalizing a "status" violates the
eighth amendment.87
Homosexual conduct remains illegal in twenty-seven states and the
80. See Reply Brief on Behalf of Defendants at 26, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199,
(E.D. Va. 1975).
81. See id. at 27.
82. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra (The public protestations of individuals do not neces-
sarily comport with the private interests of the same individuals.).
83. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
84. Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 2, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
Statutes that define a status as criminal constitute cruel and unusual punishment and are unconstitutional under
the eighth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding unconstitutional a statute making it
a crime to be a narcotics addict).
While the use of narcotics can be harmful independent of the status of being a narcotics addict and,
therefore, may be proscribed, engaging in same-sex sexual behavior is not independently harmful. See notes
68-72 and accompanying text supra; People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,489,415 N.E.2d 936, 942,434 N.Y.S.2d
947, 952-53 (1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981) (holding that while the use of marijuana within the privacy
of one's home may be proscribed because it is independently harmful to the individual, private sexual activity
may not be proscribed because it is not harmful).
85. Plaintiff's Opening Brief at 2, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
Many of plaintiffs' arguments are beyond the scope of this Comment. In addition to claiming that the right of
privacy was violated, plaintiffs contended that the Virginia statute violated the right of freedom of association,
the establishment clause of the first amendment, the right of freedom of expression, the protection of the eighth
amendment against cruel and unusual punishment, the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. For a discussion of the district court's
failure to address these issues, see Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: A Set-Back for the Right of
Privacy, 65 KY. L.J. 748 (1977); Recent Decision Note, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 15 DUQUESNE L.
REV. 123 (1976).
86. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'dmem., 425 U.S. 901
(1976). See text accompanying note 47 supra.
87. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See note 84 supra.
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District of Columbia,8 and discrimination against gay people in all areas of
daily life remains widespread. Professor Rivera, in an extensive overview of
the legal status of homosexual persons in the United States, describes the
differential treatment afforded gay people in the areas of private and federal
employment,8 9 security clearances," military employment, 9' professional and
occupational licensing,92 teaching in the public schools, 93 marriage,'
divorce, 95 child custody, % incorporation and tax exempt status,97 liquor
licensing,98 universities and other public forums,99 immigration and natural-
ization,' °o and criminal issues.'0 ' One commentator has described the effect of
differential treatment afforded homosexual persons this way: "Deprived of
the experience of personal competence and self-mastery, humans lack a sense
of self-worth, leading to the despairing inner death central to apathy,
cynicism, stoical remoteness, and spiritual slavery." ' 2 The values of intimate
association, such as society, caring and commitment, intimacy, and self-
identification, are implicated in any close personal relationship.' 3 The forma-
tion of an intimate personal relationship is a manifestation of love between
human beings, the importance of which is innately known to every human
being.'04
In the face of such discrimination, the courts have been hopelessly
divided on whether to extend judicial protection to homosexual persons.
Some courts would overturn dismissal of a homosexual who has publicly stated his
views as a violation of the first amendment's guarantee of free speech, while
others have allowed employers to fire homosexuals and thereby avoid "tacit
approval of this socially repugnant concept." Some courts would treat removal of
a homosexual bar's liquor license as a violation of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause, while others have reached the opposite conclusion. Some
courts would hold that the ninth amendment's implicit right to privacy prohibits
antisodomy laws as they apply to consenting adults, while others have limited that
right to married couples. And some courts would allow a homophile organization
the freedom to associate, while others would not. 105
88. See note 42 supra.
89. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 805-25 (1979).
90. Id. at 829-37.
91. Id. at 837-55.
92. Id. at 855-60.
93. Id. at 860-74.
94. Id. at 874-79.
95. Id. at 879-83.
96. Id. at 883-904.
97. Id. at 908-13.
98. Id. at 913-24.
99. Id. at 924-34.
100. Id. at 934-42.
101. Id. at 942-47.
102. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1281, 1306 (1977).
103. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 625, 629-37 (1980).
104. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDIIAM L.
REV. 1281, 1309 (1977).
105. Lasson, Homosexual Rights: The Law in Flux and Conflict, 9 BALT. L. REV. 47, 69-70 (1979)
(citations omitted). See also NGTF Files Lawsuit in Oklahoma to Protect Gay Teachers, It's Time, Nov.-Dec.
1980, at 1, col. I (National Gay Task Force files suit to overturn OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-103.15 (West
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Kenneth Karst suggests a simple solution to the problem of determining what
aspects of homosexual conduct justify the proscription of that conduct:
In this area, above all, the burden of justification is a critical issue; our governmen-
tal restrictions on homosexuals are very largely the product of folklore and fantasy
rather than evidence of real risk of harm. Suppose the state had to prove that a
lesbian mother, by virtue of her lesbian status alone, was unfit to have custody of
her child. Suppose that the state had to prove that a male homosexual teacher, by
virtue of his homosexual status alone, created special risk of seduction of children
assigned to his classes. Would not such empirical enterprises finally demonstrate
that the operative factor in the disqualification of homosexuals in such cases was
not risk of harm, but stigma?'0 6
Not all courts have permitted this denial of choice in intimate association
to withstand constitutional scrutiny. In People v. Onofre0 7 the New York
Court of Appeals declined to follow the lead of other courts, holding that the
prohibition of sexual conduct between persons of the same sex is unconstitu-
tional. Onofre involved three lower court cases consolidated on appeal. One
case involved consensual sodomy between two men in the privacy of their
home; 1°8 one involved consensual sodomy between a man and woman in a
parked car;'09 and one involved consensual sodomy between two men in a
parked car."0
The New York Court of Appeals, emphasizing the value of personal
autonomy, described the right of privacy as follows: "[I]t is a right of
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions, with a concomi-
tant right to conduct oneself in accordance with those decisions, undeterred
by governmental restraint .... ,.,. The court rejected the argument that the
restriction was necessary for the protection of public morals:
[I]t is not the function of the Penal Law in our governmental policy to provide
either a medium for the articulation or the apparatus for the intended enforcement
of moral or theological values. ... The community and its members are entirely
free to employ theological teaching, moral suasion, parental advice, psychological
Supp. 1981), which "'prohibits the employment of homosexuals or any person who advocates gay rights by
Oklahoma school systems."). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 941 (1978) ("The
problem of differential impact plays a particularly striking role when the state seeks to dictate the sexual
practices and preferences of adults in our society. Courts applying the decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut and
Eisenstadt v. Baird have differed on the question of whether consenting adult homosexuality can be made a
crime or otherwise burdened when the only activities performed occur in discreet privacy."); Karst, The
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 682 (1980) ("All the values of intimate association are
potentially involved in homosexual relationships; all have been impaired, in various ways, by governmental
restrictions on homosexual conduct and on persons who are deemed to be homosexuals."); see generally
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
106. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 685-86 (1980) (emphasis in original).
In essence, state legislators and courts have created an irrebuttable presumption that homosexual status makes
one per se unfit for many natural roles.
107. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981).
108. Id. at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 937-38, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
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and psychiatric counselling and other noncoercive means to condemn the practice
of consensual sodomy. The narrow question before us is whether the Federal
Constitution permits the use of the criminal law for that purpose.1
The court also drew a distinction between public and private morals:
[T]he private morality of an individual is not synonymous with nor necessarily will
have effect on what is known as public morality .... So here, the People have
failed to demonstrate how government interference with the practice of personal
choice in matters of intimate sexual behavior out of view of the public and with no
commercial component will serve to advance the cause of public morality or do
anything other than restrict individual morality chosen by the state. 
3
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the consensual sodomy
statute at issue"4 was unconstitutional because it abridged the right of
privacy." 5 This holding also was based upon the irrational distinction in the
statute between conduct performed by married couples" 6 and the same con-
duct performed by unmarried heterosexual or homosexual couples."7 Con-
sidering that private, consensual, "deviant" sexual intercourse does not
affect public morals," 8 is not dangerous to the health of the participants," 9
and is not a substitute or alternative to the institution of marriage, the court
concluded that none of these considerations justified the intrusion by the state
into the private choices of the defendants.
III. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY:
THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE LIFE
The right of privacy has been invoked under the authority of the
European Convention on Human Rights'2' to protect the right of gay men to
112. Id. at 488 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 940 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3.
113. Id. at 489, 415 N.E.2d at 941,434 N.Y.S.2d at 952. The permissible limits of governmental regulation
of public morality may be determined under first amendment principles. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Case Comment, Sticks and Stones: Homosexual Solicitations
and the Fighting Words Doctrine, 41 OHIO Sr. L.J. 553 (1980).
114. The New York statute reads as follows: "A person is guilty ofconsensual sodomy when he engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with another person. Consensual sodomy is a class B misdemeanor." N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 130.38 (1975). "Deviate sexual intercourse" is defined as "sexual conduct between persons not married
to each other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and penis, or the mouth and the
vulva." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(2) (1975).
115. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 485, 415 N.E.2d 936, 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 949 (1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981).
116. See note 114 supra.
117. The court stated:
Because the statutes are broad enough to reach noncommercial cloistered personal sexual conduct of
consenting adults and because it permits the same conduct between persons married to each other
without sanction, we agree with defendants' contentions that it violates both their right of privacy and
the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed them by the United States Constitution.
People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 485, 415 N.E.2d 936, 938-39, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 949 (1980), cert. denied, 101
S.Ct. 2323 (1981).
118. Id. at 489, 415 N.E.2d at 941,434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. The European Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1950. Prior to the adoption of this
document, the United Nations had adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, Article 12 of
which deals with the right to respect for private life. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS MANUAL
4 (1963).
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live their chosen lifestyle free of governmental intrusion. In Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom 22 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Northern
Ireland's sodomy law violated the right to respect for private life guaranteed
by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.'
2
On May 22, 1976, Jeffrey Dudgeon, a member of the Northern Ireland
Gay Rights Association, 2 4 filed a complaint with the European Commission
of Human Rights, alleging that Northern Ireland's sodomy law, which pro-
hibited consensual private homosexual acts between men, violated the right
to respect for private life.' 5 A similar law had been repealed in England in
1967 when the recommendations of the Wolfenden Report 126 were adopted.'2 7
The Wolfenden Report was prepared for the British Parliament and con-
sidered "scientific facts, the sentiment of the community, the wisdom of legal
and scientific experts, the structure of the law, and the ideals of a civilized
society" in reaching its conclusions. 28 Drafters of this report rejected the
protection of morals as a jastification for the criminalization of private homo-
sexual conduct after considering the proper relation between concepts of
morality and the criminal law: "But moral conviction or instinctive feeling,
however strong, is not a valid basis for overriding the individual's privacy and
for bringing within the ambit of the criminal law private sexual behavior of
this kind."' 9
The European Commission of Human Rights concluded, by a vote of
eight to one, that the legal prohibition against homosexual conduct between
men aged twenty-one years and older breached Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and, agreeing with the drafters of the Wolfenden
Report, that the prohibition was not justified by the alleged protection of
morals. 3° The Commission stated:
122. 1981 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Court on Human Rights) (judgment).
123. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights reads as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. VIII, 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
124. The Times (London), Aug. 4, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
125. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1980 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights), aff'd, 1981 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Ct. of Human Rights).
126. WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTI-
TUTION (1963).
127. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1980 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights) (judgment).
128. WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF ThE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTI-
TUTION 5 (1963).
129. Id. at 1 54.
130. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1980 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights) (judgment). The European Convention on Human Rights contains an internal procedure for
bringing a complaint before the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights. While individual applicants may not bring a complaint before to the European Court of Human Rights,
they may bring a complaint before the European Commission of Human Rights after satisfying several prelimin-
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[T]he Convention... preserves to the individual an area of strictly private moral-
ity in which the State may not interfere.... It would be quite contrary to this
principle to interpret Art. 8(2) as allowing a majority an unqualified right to impose
its standards of private sexual morality on the whole of society.
13 1
Despite the Irish government's argument that the prohibition of homosexual
conduct was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of morals,'
32
the Commission was not convinced that any "pressing social need" had been
shown requiring the maintenance of this prohibition.
133
The government also argued that Dudgeon was not a victim of a breach of
the European Convention on Human Rights'34 because he had never been
prosecuted under the sodomy law at issue.135 The applicant asserted that "he
had personally suffered prejudice, in the form of fear and distress, as a result
of the existence of these offences":
136
He [Dudgeon] stated that he had been consciously homosexual from the age of
fourteen years; he had been aware of disapproving social attitudes toward homo-
ary requirements. The requirements include: the applicant must be a victim of a breach of the Convention
(Article 25); the act of which the applicant complains must be an act of a public authority (Article 25); the
government against which the applicant complains must recognize the right of individual petition (Article 25);
the applicant must make a reasonable effort to obtain redress of his or her grievance in the country concerned
before making application to the Commission (Article 26); and the application must be brought within six
months of the act of which the applicant complains or within six months of the decision of the country
concerned, including any final decision on efforts to obtain redress (Article 26). The Commission will not deal
with an application that is anonymous or one that is substantially the same as a matter already considered
(Article 27).
The Commission then reviews the application and may deem it inadmissible for any of the above reasons
(Article 27). An opinion is published, stating the Commission's reasons for declaring the application inadmis-
sible. When a petition is declared admissible, i.e., accepted, the Commission may examine the petition with
assistance from the representatives of the parties and investigate the facts alleged (Article 28). Article 28 of the
Convention charges the Commission with the duty to secure a friendly settlement of the complaint, if possible. If
no friendly settlement can be reached, the Commission adopts its report under Article 31 of the Convention.
This report contains the findings of fact and an opinion discussing whether the Convention has been breached.
The report is then transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and to all of the states
involved, none of which is at liberty to publish the opinion of the Commission (Article 31). The Committee of
Ministers, in turn, must either refer the application to the Court of Human Rights within three months or decide
by majority vote whether the Convention has been breached (Article 32). The decisions of the Committee of
Ministers are binding on the High Contracting Parties (member states) by virtue of Article 32 of the Convention.
It is important to note that only the High Contracting Parties, the European Commission of Human Rights, and
the Committee of Ministers may bring a case before the European Court of Human Rights; individual
applicants must first appeal to the Commission. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS MANUAL
97-122 (1963); J. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 227-
322 (1969).
The Dudgeon case was referred to the European Court of Human Rights by the Council of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on July 18, 1980. The court rendered its decision on October22, 1980, affirming the decision of
the Commission that Northern Ireland's sodomy law breached Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Dudgeon Case, 1981 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Ct. on Human Rights) (judgment).
131. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1980 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights) (judgment).
132. Id. at -.
133. Id. at-.
134. Article 25 of the European Convention of Human Rights requires that the applicant under the Conven-
tion be a victim of a breach of the Convention. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art XXV, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. J. FAWCET, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 277-88 (1969).
135. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1980 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights) (judgment).
136. Id. at-.
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sexual behavior and had experienced fear, suffering and distress directly caused
by the existence of the offences in question. He alleged that the prejudice he had
personally suffered included psychological distress, fear of legal repercussions
through meeting with other homosexuals, fear of harassment, blackmail, persecu-
tion and resultant disclosure and exposure. Relations with his family had been
affected by parental fears that his homosexual status might become known. This
had caused psychological upset and retardation of his motivation to advance him-
self. He had thus suffered direct economic loss.1
37
Accepting Dudgeon's description of the harm he had suffered and holding that
this satisfied the requirement that an applicant be'a victim of breach of the
Convention,3 " the Commission stated:
[T]he mere fact that a penal law has not been enforced by means of criminal
proceedings, or is unlikely to be so enforced, does not of itself negate the possibil-
ity that it has effects amounting to interference with private life. A primary
purpose of any such law is to prevent the conduct it proscribes, by persuasion or
deterrence. It also stigmatises the conduct as unlawful and undesirable. These
aspects must also be taken into consideration.
•.. [I]t is inevitable, in the Commission's opinion, that the existence of the
law will give rise to a degree of fear or restraint on the part of male homosexuals. 1
39
In summarily affirming the district court decision, the United States
Supreme Court may have relied on the fact that the plaintiffs in Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney"4 had never been charged or prosecuted under the
Virginia sodomy statute. The Supreme Court may have concluded that the
plaintiffs thus lacked standing to assert the unconstitutionality of the Virginia
statute.'41 As exposed in the well-reasoned opinion of the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights, this belief that homosexual persons who have not been
prosecuted under sodomy statutes have not "sustained or [are not] immedi-
ately in danger of sustaining some direct injury"' 42 from these laws is clearly
137. Id. at-.
138. See note 134 supra.
139. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1980 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights), aff'd, 1981 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Ct. of Human Rights).
140. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
141. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 493, 415 N.E.2d 936, 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 954 (1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323 (1981). In this respect, it is significant that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Onofre,
a case holding that New York's sodomy law violated the right of privacy. Onofre presented the New York Court
of Appeals with three actual prosecutions under the statute at issue while Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
sought a declaratory judgment regarding the Virginia sodomy statute. Cf. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (indigent persons and organizations representing indigent persons' interests held not to
have standing to challenge I.R.S. ruling granting favorable tax treatment to hospitals that exclude indigent
persons); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (individuals seeking to reside in area of Rochester, N.Y.,
Rochester taxpayers, organizations of residents of the area of Rochester affected, and housing developers held
not to have standing to assert cause of action based on fact that Rochester zoning ordinance excluded low
income persons from given area of city); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (political activists under surveillance
by Army lack standing to assert violation of first amendment right of freedom of association); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (environmental public interest group lacked standing to attack recreational devel-
opment in national forest).
142. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). See cases cited in note 141 supra.
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wrong. Homosexual persons have suffered, and continue to suffer, discrimi-
nation and abuse in the name of the protection of public decency.
44
The discrimination suffered by homosexual persons in Northern Ireland
is comparable to that suffered by homosexual residents of states within the
United States retaining criminal penalties for homosexual conduct. The
separate opinion of Mr. Polak in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom aptly sum-
marizes this discrimination:
The prohibition, with its possibility of very heavy sanctions in case of contraven-
tion, stigmatizes homosexuality between consenting adults in private as a very
severe crime. By doing so the State... supports and intensifies old and deep-
seated sentiments of aversion and fear which have been proved to be unjustifiable
and without factual ground. It strengthens the prejudices against homosexuals, it
perpetuates their fear of prosecution and punishment, it compels them to keep
secret or suppress their sexual inclinations and wishes, and it increases the danger
of blackmail. By maintaining these provisions the State discriminates strongly
against this group of the population in comparison with heterosexual adults who
are free to have any kind of sexual contact in private. This difference amounts to a
clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right in question, which is a
fundamental aspect of this case.44
The interference with private life caused by sodomy laws had reached the
European Commission of Human Rights before Dudgeon brought his claim. 45
However, the ruling in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom represents the first time
that an international tribunal has held that the legitimate governmental objec-
tive of protecting public morals does not justify the wholesale proscription of
private adult homosexual conduct.'4 Both the European Commission on
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, applying the
European Convention on Human Rights' version of the right of privacy,
concluded that the fundamental right of intimate association could not be
subordinated to a majority view of morality.
Like the right of privacy in the United States, the right to respect for
private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights has
been expanded slowly by the European Commission on Human Rights until it
now embraces the right of intimate association. In a 1960 application before
the Commission a citizen of Germany complained that the German Penal
Code, which made homosexual acts a crime, violated his right to respect for
private life under Article V 47 In this case, the police had searched the appli-
143. See notes 88-105 and accompanying text supra.
144. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1980 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights) (judgment).
145. Application No. 530/59, 1960 Y. B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 184 (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights); X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1976 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 276 (Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights); X. v. United Kingdom, 1978 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 354 (Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights) (determination of admissibility).
146. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1980 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RGHTS-(Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights), aff'd, 1981 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS-(Eur. Ct. of Human Rights).
147. Application No. 530159, 1960 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 184, 188 (Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights).
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cant's home and had seized books and papers, an act that had resulted in
searches of other persons' homes.' 48 The applicant asserted that "[tlo make
[homosexuality] an offence is a violation of the right to life, the corollary of
which is the right to love.', 149 The Commission concluded that the complaint
did not state a violation of the right to respect for private life under Article 8,
and that the interference described could be justified by the protection of




In 1975 the Commission again had occasion to review an application
charging that another section of the German Penal Code violated the right to
respect for private life under Article 8. The complaint in X. v. Federal
Republic of Germany52 alleged that the German statute that prohibited
homosexual acts with men' 53 under the age of twenty-one breached Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant had been
convicted of engaging in homosexual conduct with men under the age of
twenty-one.'5 4 The Commission found that "[a] person's sexual life is un-
doubtedly part of his private life of which it constitutes an important
aspect." ' 55 However, it determined that the application was inadmissible be-
cause "[t]he fact remains that the action of the German legislature was clearly
inspired by the need to protect the rights of children and adolescents and
enable them to achieve true autonomy in sexual matters."' 56 Unlike the
proscription of private consensual homosexual conduct between adults at
issue in Dudgeon, the European Commission here examined the need to
protect young people from homosexual experience.
In 1978 the Commission adopted its report under Article 31 in X. v.
United Kingdom,' 57 a case substantially similar to that of the 1976 case of X.
v. Federal Republic of Germany. The X. v. United Kingdom application was
declared admissible on July 7, 1977.158 Apparently, in the two years between
the German application and this British application, the Commission had
made a decision to review more thoroughly the issue of the relationship
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 190.
151. Id. at 196. See note 130 supra for the requirements that must be met to make an application admissible.
152. 1976 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 276 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
153. The German statute, SrRAFGESETZBUCH [SrGB] art. 175(2), by its language expressly applied only
to males. Id. at 286.
154. Id. at 278.
155. Id. at 284. See also notes 130-46 and accompanying text supra (In 1980 the European Commission of
Human Rights concluded that the protection of morality would not justify the wholesale proscription of homo-
sexuality.); notes 158-59 infra (In 1978, the Commission concluded that alhigherage of consent for homosexual,
as opposed to heterosexual, conduct is justified by the need for the protection of others.).
156. X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1976 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 276,284-86 (Eur.
Comm'n on Human Rights).
157. 1978 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 354 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights) (determination of
admissibility).
158. Id. at 374.
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between laws regulating homosexual conduct and the right of respect for
private life.' 59
In X. v. United Kingdom the applicant complained that his conviction
under the English law forbidding homosexual conduct with men tl ° under the
age of twenty-one, while heterosexual conduct was permitted between
persons aged eighteen or older, breached his right to respect for private life
under Article 8.161 The applicant pointed out that only three European coun-
tries totally prohibit homosexual conduct;I62 that three impose no special
restrictions on homosexual conduct; I63 and that the remaining European
countries' legislation prescribe various ages of consent for homosexual
conduct, virtually all of which are lower than the age of consent provided
under English law. 14 The Commission concluded that the prosecution and
imprisonment of the applicant constituted interference with his private life, 65
but that such interference was justified under the protection of the rights of
others under paragraph two of Article 8 66 The Commission did not deem it
necessary to reach the issue of whether the restrictions were necessary to
protect the morals of the country as claimed by the respondent government.' 67
The Commission placed heavy emphasis on the finding of the English appeals
court that the applicant had used force in his relationship with one of his
under-age partners. 68 It is not known how the Commission would have
decided the case had these allegations of violence been absent from the
record.
Thus, the European Commission. of Human Rights repeatedly has
addressed the issue of whether restrictions on homosexual conduct interfere
with the right to respect for private life. The Commission has concluded that
such restrictions do interfere with the right to respect for private life but that,
at least where force or violence is used, a higher age of consent for homo-
sexual conduct may be required than that for heterosexual conduct. How-
ever, a total proscription of homosexual conduct constitutes an interference
159. If the Commission determines that a complaint raises no issue of breach of the Convention, it may
declare the application inadmissible. If the Commission requires further investigation, it may declare the appli-
cation admissible. See note 130 supra.
160. The English statute, Sexual Offences Act, 4 & 5 Eliz.2, ch. 69, § 13 (1956), by its language applied only
to males.
161. X. v. United Kingdom,, 1978 Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 354, 368 (Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights) (determination of admissibility).
162. The three countries that prohibit homosexual conduct are the U.S.S.R., Rumania, and Eire. Case of
X. REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 57 (Eur. Conv. on Human Rights) (1978).
But see notes 122-46 and accompanying text supra (discussing sodomy law of Northem Ireland found to breach
applicant's right to respect for private life).
163. The three countries with no special restrictions are Norway, Portugal, and Italy. Case of X. REPORT
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 157 (Eur. Cony. on Human Rights) (1978).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 91127.
166. Id. at 1135.
167. Id. at T 136. See notes 122-46 and accompanying text supra (protection of public morality will not
justify total proscription of homosexual conduct).
168. Case of X. REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS SS 131-35 (Eur. Cony. on
Human Rights) (1978).
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with the right to respect for private life that is not justified by the objective of
protecting morals.
IV. RATIONAL LMrs ON THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY:
A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
The right of privacy has progressed both within the United States 69 and
within an international context. 70 What had its origins in the United States in
the protection of the "orderly pursuit of happiness"' 7' has progressed to
include the rights to determine how one's children will be educated,In to
enjoy the sanctity of the home free of unwarranted intrusion by the state,I73 to
use contraceptives, whether the individual is married 74 or unmarried,'75 to
choose to terminate a pregnancy,' 76 and to define one's own family unit with-
out interference by the state.' 7 The foundation underlying these decisions is
the protection of the "orderly pursuit of happiness," of which the pursuit of
intimate relationships is an integral component.7"
This right of privacy in the United States is a right of autonomy. It is a
.right with which the state may not interfere absent compelling justification. 179
The right of privacy provides protection for the freedom to choose one's
partner in intimate association, including a partner of the same sex, and to act
upon that choice. Compelling justification for the prohibition of sexual
conduct encompassed by sodomy statutes does not exist.18
The same protection for private life, embodied in Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations,'8 ' has been recognized as
encompassing sexual intimacy within the private sphere.I 2 The justifications
under this international law for governmental intervention into one's private
sphere have progressed from the general protection of morals8 3 to the protec-
169. See notes 9-32 and accompanying text supra.
170. See notes 122-68 and accompanying text supra.
171. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
172. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
173. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra.
174. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
175. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
176. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See notes 15-21 and accompanying text supra.
177. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). See generally notes 9-41 and accompanying text
supra.
178. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
179. See note 21 supra.
180. See notes 42-83 and accompanying text supra.
181. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations reads as follows: "No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G. A. Res 217 (I1), U.N. Dec. A1810, at 75
(1948).
182. See notes 121-34 and accompanying text supra.




tion of others."" No longer is the protection of morality and decency con-
sidered a necessary aim requiring interference with an individual's choice of
intimate association.
85
The same justifications as proposed by the proponents of sodomy legisla-
tion in the United States failed to convince the European Commission (and
Court) of Human Rights of the necessity of such legislation.' 86 The European
Convention on Human Rights, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
protects only the most fundamental of human rights-those necessary for the
meaningful existence of a people.
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and
peace in the world .... Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the
Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom .... Now, therefore, the General Assembly Proclaims this Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations. 87
The right of privacy, as it has evolved within the United States, comports
easily with the right to respect for private life as it has evolved under interna-
tional law. It remains for the Supreme Court of the United States, consistent
with its countermajoritarian function of preserving the rights of minority
populations,'88 to recognize expressly the right of all citizens of the United
States to be free to associate in intimate relationships without unwarranted
governmental intrusion. Only when the highept authority has extended pro-
tection for individual choices in intimate association will the egregious dis-
crimination encountered by homosexual persons in the United States '89
cease.
Catherine E. Blackburn
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